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Abstract. Modern Science, an essay written by Lev Nikolàevič Tolstoy in 1898 is here 
reproduced in its complete version, as a historical document containing philosophical 
reflections on the practical functions and the cultural and educational role science has, or 
should have, in contemporary societies. The text was cited by Aldous Huxley in the foreword to 
Science, Liberty and Peace, a booklet written in 1946 in the aftermath of the second world war, 
with the threat of nuclear doomsday on the horizon. Are science and technology really at the 
service of universal needs, as it is continuously claimed – Tolstoy asks, and Huxley echoes – or 
are their services rather directed to preserving the power of the elites or dominant classes 
against the multitude of the oppressed? 
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In 1946, the English writer and essayist 
Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) – brother of the 
internationalist and philosopher Julian 
Huxley and nephew of the evolutionary 
biologist Thomas Huxley, the first pugnacious 
defender of Darwin’s ideas – wrote a 
renowned and acclaimed booklet entitled 
Science, Liberty and Peace, a collection of 
reflections on the relationship between 
science and power, the violence inherent in 
modern production and consumer trends and 
possible routes to a nonviolent transition in 
the role of science in modern societies. 
After the earliest terrifying conflagrations of 
the nuclear age, and in the shadow of the 
ruins of World War II, with only a feeble hope 
for an enduring peace, Huxley vehemently 
denounced the subjection of science and 
technology to power, arguing that in each and 
every activity of mass control, like 
armaments, communication media, and 
industry, science and technology play a 
crucial role. However, contrary to what is 
usually believed, their major contribution in 
instrumental terms results in giving support 
to the oppressors and frustrating the 
development of peace and human rights. 
Throughout the nineteenth century – Huxley 
added – the intervention of the “popular 
military forces of liberation” seemed able to 
open important pathways and perspectives 
for the emancipation of poor multitudes 
through barricades and forks that opposed 
the cavalry and cannons of the ruling classes. 
Subsequently, in the face of the rapid 
development of armaments technologies, the 
possibilities of resistance by working class 
citizens were dramatically reduced, becoming 
symbolic in most cases or of minimal efficacy. 
Similarly, mass communications and control 
of the media – at that time corresponding to 
printed press and radio – were becoming 
above all successful means of coercion in the 
hands of the oppressors, once again 
reiterating the possibility for a minority to 
manipulate the many. Since then – Huxley 
concluded – mass production, which is the 
very essence of industrial society, has played 
a fundamental role in control and social 
subjection processes, and that is why 
centralized production, which is in the hands 
of governments and big corporations, still 
creates all manner of obstacles to the 
widespread and participated production of 
goods of any type. 
In Science, Liberty and Peace Huxley began 
with a quotation from the Russian writer and 
philosopher Lev Nikolàevič Tolstoy (1828-
1910). Although best known for his literary 
masterpieces, Tolstoy composed also various 
essays on art, history, politics, philosophy and 
religion. While Huxley did not refer directly to 
any of Tolstoy works as a source of 
inspiration, the original text is clearly 
recognizable. In the period between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Tolstoy 
was moved to commenting on a text by the 
English writer Edward Carpenter (1844-
1929) Modern Science: a Criticism, published 
in Civilization: its Cause and Cure, in 1885. 
Tolstoy wrote his commentary, Modern 
Science, in the form of a preface to the 
Russian translation of Carpenter’s essay by 
his older brother, Count Sergius Tolstoy. This 
is the manuscript Huxley referred to in his 
booklet on science and peace. 
In the belief that this text is still of great 
pertinence, the complete translation of 
Modern Science is reproduced as it appeared 
in a 1961 English edition of Tolstoy’s 
writings, Recollection and Essays, 
maintaining the early twentieth-century 
version by Aylmer and Louise Maude, the first 
British translators of Tolstoy's works. 
As noted by Aylmer Maude in his original 
notes, Modern Science forms a companion 
article to the conclusion (Chapter XX) of 
Tolstoy’s essay What is Art? (1896) – a 
treatise concerning the nature and purpose of 
art, describing how artistic expressions can 
convey moral values. Tolstoy wrote the 
essays in the same period and both deal with 
Visions for Sustainability 1: 39-46, 2014 
 
P a g e   | 41 
 
practically the same topic: the sense and the 
purpose that art and science should have and 
sustain in human society. According to 
Tolstoy “Science and art are as closely bound 
together as the lungs and the heart, so that if 
one organ is vitiated the other cannot act 
rightly” (Tolstoy 1897, p. 201). Art should not 
be appreciated so much for its ability to 
express beauty as in terms of its ability to 
communicate concepts of morality and 
aesthetic values. In the same way, the aim of 
science is not merely to inform or entertain, 
but to provide a means of expression of any 
experience and any aspect of the human 
condition, investigating and bringing to 
human awareness the truths and the 
knowledge that the people of a given time and 
society consider most important. 
Tolstoy’s view reflected the idiosyncratic and 
personal nature of his interpretation of 
Christianity. While he was attempting to 
define universal and inclusive concepts of art 
and science, his aesthetic vision was so 
narrowly focused on considerations of 
morality that he concluded their definition in 
exclusive terms related solely to moral and 
social aspects. “Art should really abandon its 
false path and take the new direction, it is 
necessary that another equally important 
human spiritual activity, – science, – in 
intimate dependence on which art always 
rests, should abandon the false path which it 
too, like art, is following” (Tolstoy 1897, p. 
200). The aim of science is to discover, as far 
as possible, the essential truth of life’s 
meaning, in the conviction that this truth is 
good and that, once discovered, it will resolve 
the disagreements and conflicts that plague 
humanity. Thus “if the path chosen by science 
be false so also will be the path taken by art 
(…) a false activity of science inevitably 
causes a correspondingly false activity of art” 
(Tolstoy 1897, p. 201). 
Huxley echoes Tolstoy in the belief that if 
science really wishes to devote itself to 
promoting liberty and peace, then it should 
readdress its concerns. Scientists should 
boycott harmful studies and develop actions 
to sustain the search for social values. To 
achieve this goal, specific political actions are 
necessary aimed at public control and 
democratic redirection of scientific progress 
and appropriate scientific and technological 
enterprises, for example, by favouring and 
guiding in all parts of the world, political 
freedom and respect for human rights 
through the spread of knowledge and 
scientific awareness, or by selecting and 
developing cheap and easily accessible 
technological means that ensure energetic 
and nutritional autonomy for all. Otherwise, 
in the words of Tolstoy as long as “a small 
number of people have power over the 
Majority and oppress it, every victory over 
Nature will inevitably serve only to increase 
that power and that oppression.” (Tolstoy 
1898 p. 185, Huxley 1946).  
MODERN SCIENCE 
παντì λòγω λογοσ ïσοs αντικειται 1 
I THINK this article of Carpenter's on Modern 
Science should be particularly useful in 
Russian society, where more than anywhere 
else in Europe, there is a prevalent and 
deeply rooted superstition which considers 
that humanity does not need the diffusion of 
true religious and moral knowledge for its 
welfare, but only the study of experimental 
science, and that such science will satisfy all 
the spiritual demands of mankind. 
It is evident how harmful an influence (quite 
like that of religious superstition) so gross a 
superstition must have on man's moral life. 
And therefore the publication of the thoughts 
of writers who treat experimental science and 
its method critically is specially desirable in 
our society. 
Carpenter shows that neither astronomy, nor 
physics, nor chemistry, nor biology, nor 
sociology supplies us with true knowledge of 
                                                 
1
 To every argument an equal argument is matched. 
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actual facts; that all the laws discovered by 
those sciences are merely generalizations 
having but an approximate value as laws, and 
that only as long as we do not know, or leave 
out of account, certain other factors; and that 
even these laws seem laws to us only because 
we discover them in a region so far away 
from us in time and space that we cannot 
detect their non-correspondence with actual 
fact. 
Moreover Carpenter points out that the 
method of science which consists in 
explaining things near and important to us by 
things more remote and indifferent, is a false 
method which can never bring us to the 
desired result. 
He says that every science tries to explain the 
facts it is investigating by means of 
conceptions of a lower order. 'Each science 
has been as far as possible reduced to its 
lowest terms. Ethics has been made a 
question of utility and inherited experience. 
Political economy has been exhausted of all 
conceptions of justice between man and man, 
of charity, affection, and the instinct of 
solidarity, and has been founded on its lowest 
discoverable factor, namely, self-interest. 
Biology has been denuded of the force of 
personality in plants, animals, and men; the 
"self" here has been set aside and an attempt 
made to reduce the science to a question of 
chemical and cellular affinities, protoplasm, 
and the laws of osmose. Chemical affinities 
again, and all the wonderful phenomena of 
physics are reduced to a flight of atoms; and 
the flight of atoms (and of astronomic orbs as 
well) is reduced to the laws of dynamics.’ 
It is supposed that the reduction of questions 
of a higher order to questions of a lower 
order will explain the former. But an 
explanation is never obtained in this way. 
What happens is merely that, descending ever 
lower and lower in one's investigations, from 
the most important questions to less 
important ones, science reaches at last a 
sphere quite foreign to man, with which he is 
barely in touch, and confines its attention to 
that sphere, leaving all unsolved the 
questions most important to him. 
It is as if a man, wishing to understand the 
use of an object lying before him – instead of 
coming close to it, examining it from all sides 
and handling it – were to retire farther and 
farther from it until he as at such a distance 
that all its peculiarities of colour and 
inequalities of surface had disappeared and 
only its outline was still visible against the 
horizon; and as if from there he were to begin 
writing a minute description of the object, 
imagining that now at last he clearly 
understood it, and that this understanding, 
formed at such a distance, would assist a 
complete comprehension of it. It is this self-
deception that is partly exposed by 
Carpenter's criticism, which shows first that 
the knowledge afforded us by the natural 
sciences amounts merely to convenient 
generalizations which certainly do not 
express actual facts; and  secondly that facts 
of a higher order will never be explained by 
reducing them to facts of a lower order. 
But without predetermining the question 
whether experimental science will, or will 
not, by its methods, ever bring us to the 
solution of the most serious problems of 
human life, the activity of experimental 
science itself, in its relation to the eternal and 
most reasonable demands of man, is so 
anomalous as to be amazing. 
People must live. But in order to live they 
must know how to live. And men have always 
obtained this knowledge – well or ill – and in 
conformity with it have lived and progressed. 
And this knowledge of how men should live 
has – from the days of Moses, Solon, and 
Confucius – always been considered a science, 
the very essence of science. Only in our time 
has it come to be considered that the science 
telling us how to live is not a science at all, but 
that the only real science is experimental 
science – commencing with mathematics and 
ending in sociology. 
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And a strange misunderstanding results. 
A plain reasonable working man supposes, in 
the old way which is also the common-sense 
way, that if there are people who spend their 
lives in study, whom he feeds and keeps while 
they think for him – then no doubt these men 
are engaged in studying things men need to 
know; and he expects science to solve for him 
the questions on which his welfare and that of 
all men depends. He expects science to tell 
him how he ought to live: how to treat his 
family, his neighbours and the men of other 
tribes, how to restrain his passions, what to 
believe in and what not to believe in, and 
much else. But what does our science say to 
him on these matters? 
It triumphantly tells him how many million 
miles it is from the earth to the sun; at what 
rate light travels through space; how many 
million vibrations of ether per second are 
caused by light, and how many vibrations of 
air by sound; it tells of the chemical 
components of the Milky Way, of a new 
element helium of micro-organisms and their 
excrements, of the points on the hand at 
which electricity collects, of X-rays, and 
similar things. 
'But I don't want any of those things,' says a 
plain and reasonable man – 'I want to know 
how to live.' 
'What does it matter what you want?' replies 
science. 'What you are asking about relates to 
sociology. Before replying to sociological 
questions, we have yet to solve questions of 
zoology, botany, physiology, and biology in 
general; but to solve those questions we have 
first to solve questions of physics, and then of 
chemistry, and have also to agree as to the 
shape of the infinitesimal atoms, and how it is 
that imponderable and incompressible ether 
transmits energy.' 
And people – chiefly those who sit on the 
backs of others, and to whom it is therefore 
convenient to wait – are content with such 
replies, and sit blinking and awaiting the 
fulfilment of these promises; but plain and 
reasonable working men – such as those on 
whose backs these others sit while occupying 
themselves with science – the whole great 
mass of men, the whole of humanity, cannot 
be satisfied by such answers, but naturally 
ask in perplexity: 'But when will this be done? 
We cannot wait. You say that you will 
discover these things after some generations. 
But we are alive now – alive to-day and dead 
to-morrow – and we want to know how to 
live our life while we have it. So teach us!' 
'What a stupid and ignorant man!' replies 
science. 'He does not understand that science 
exists not for use, but for science. Science 
studies whatever presents itself for study, 
and cannot select the subjects to be studied. 
Science studies everything. That is the 
characteristic of science. 
And scientists are really convinced that to be 
occupied with trifles, while neglecting what is 
more essential and important, is a 
characteristic not of themselves but of 
science. The plain, reasonable man, however, 
begins to suspect that this characteristic 
pertains not to science, but to men who are 
inclined to occupy themselves with trifles and 
to attach great importance to those trifles. 
'Science studies everything,' say the 
scientists. But, really, everything is too much. 
Everything is an infinite quantity of objects; it 
is impossible at one and the same time to 
study everything. As a lantern cannot light up 
everything, but only lights up the place on 
which it is turned or the direction in which 
the man carrying it is walking, so also science 
cannot study everything, but inevitably only 
studies that to which its attention is directed. 
And as a lantern lights up most strongly the 
things nearest to it, and less and less strongly 
the things that are more and more remote 
from it, and does not light up at all those 
things beyond its reach, so also human 
science of whatever kind has always studied 
and still studies most carefully what seems 
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most important to the investigators, less 
carefully what seems to them less important, 
and quite neglects the whole remaining 
infinite quantity of objects. And what has 
defined and still defines for men the subjects 
they are to consider most important, less 
important, and unimportant, is the general 
understanding of the meaning and purpose of 
life (that is to say, the religion) possessed by 
those who occupy themselves with science. 
But men of science to-day – not 
acknowledging any religion, and having 
therefore no standard by which to choose the 
subjects most important for study, or to 
discriminate them from less important 
subjects and, ultimately, from that infinite 
quantity of objects which the limitations of 
the human mind, and the infinity of the 
number of those objects, will always cause to 
remain uninvestigated – have formed for 
themselves a theory of 'science for science's 
sake', according to which science is to study 
not what mankind needs, but everything. 
And indeed experimental science studies 
everything, not in the sense of the totality of 
objects, but in the sense of disorder-chaos in 
the arrangement of the objects studied. That 
is to say, science does not devote most 
attention to what people most need, less to 
what they need less, and none at all to what is 
quite useless; it studies anything that 
happens to come to hand. 
Though Comte's and other classifications of 
the sciences exist, these classifications do not 
govern the selection of subjects for study; 
that selection is dependent on the human 
weaknesses common to men of science as 
well as to the rest of mankind. So that in 
reality scientists do not study everything, as 
they imagine and declare; they study what is 
more profitable and easier to study. And it is 
more profitable to study things that conduce 
to the well-being of the upper classes, with 
whom the men of science are connected; and 
it is easier to study things that lack life. 
Accordingly, many men of science study 
books, monuments, and inanimate bodies. 
Such study is considered the most real 
'science'. So that in our day what is 
considered to be the most real 'science', the 
only one (as the Bible was considered the 
only book worthy of the name), is not the 
contemplation and investigation of how to 
make the life of man more kindly and more 
happy, but the compilation and copying from 
many books into one, of all that our 
predecessors wrote on a certain subject, the 
pouring of liquids out of one glass bottle into 
another, the skilful slicing of microscopic 
preparations, the cultivation of bacteria, the 
cutting up of frogs and dogs, the investigation 
of X-rays, the theory  of numbers, the 
chemical composition of the stars, &c. 
Meanwhile all those sciences which aim at 
making  human life kindlier and happier – 
religious, moral, and social science – are 
considered by the dominant science to be 
unscientific, and are    abandoned to the 
theologians, philosophers, jurists, historians, 
and political economists, who under the guise 
of scientific investigation are chiefly occupied 
in demonstrating that the existing order of 
society (the advantages  of which they enjoy) 
is the very one which ought to exist, and that 
therefore it must not only not be changed, but 
must be maintained by all means. 
Not to mention theology and jurisprudence, 
political economy – the most advanced of the 
sciences of this group – is remarkable in this 
respect. The most prevalent political 
economy (that of Karl Marx)2,accepting the 
existing order of life as though it were what it 
ought to be, not only does not call on men to 
alter that order – that is to say, does not point 
out to them how they ought to live that their 
                                                 
2 From the Marxian point of view improvement 
can be inflicted on a people by external pressure, 
and there are witnesses to say that this has been 
accomplished in Russia. But it remains to be 
proved whether mankind can be made better or 
happier without freedom of thought or a religious 
understanding of life. ‘For the things which are 
seen are temporal, but the things that are not seen 
are eternal.' – A. M. 
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condition may improve – but on the contrary 
demands an increase in the cruelty of the 
existing order of things, that its more-than 
questionable predictions concerning what 
will happen if people continue to live as badly 
as they are now living may be fulfilled. 
And as always occurs, the lower a human 
activity descends – the more widely it 
diverges from what it should be – the more its 
self-confidence increases. That is just what 
has happened with the science of to-day. True 
science is never appreciated by its 
contemporaries, but on the contrary is 
usually persecuted. 
Nor can this be otherwise. True science 
shows men their mistakes, and points to new, 
unaccustomed ways of life. And both these 
services are unpleasant to the ruling section 
of society. 
But present-day science not only does not run 
counter to the tastes and demands of the 
ruling section of society; it quite complies 
with them. It satisfies idle curiosity, excites 
people's wonder, and promises them increase 
of pleasure. And so, whereas all that is truly 
great is calm, modest, and unnoticed, the 
science of to-day knows no limits to its self-
laudation. 
'All former methods were erroneous, and all 
that used to be considered science was an 
imposture, a blunder, and of no account. Only 
our method is true, and the only true science 
is ours. The success of our science is such that 
thousands of years have not done what we 
have accomplished in the last century. In the 
future, travelling the same path, our science 
will solve all questions and make all mankind 
happy. Our science is the most important 
activity in the world, and we men of science 
are the most important and necessary people 
in the world. 
'So think and say the scientists of to-day, and 
the cultured crowd echo it, but really at no 
previous time and among no people has 
science – the whole of science with all its 
knowledge – stood on so low a level as at 
present. One part of it, which should study the 
things that make human life kind and happy, 
is occupied In justifying the existing evil 
order of society; another part is engaged in 
solving questions of idle curiosity. 
'What? Idle curiosity? I hear voices ask in 
indignation at such blasphemy. 'What about 
steam and Electricity and telephones, and all 
our technical improvements? Not to speak of 
their scientific importance, see what practical 
results they have produced! Man has 
conquered Nature and subjugated its forces' . 
. . with more to the same effect. 
'But all the practical results of the victories 
over Nature have till now – for a considerable 
time past – gone to factories that injure the 
workmen's health, have produced weapons to 
kill men with, and increased luxury and 
corruption' replies a plain, reasonable man 
'and therefore the victory of man over Nature 
has not only failed to increase the welfare of 
human beings, but has on the contrary made 
their condition worse.’ 
If the arrangement of society is bad (as ours 
is), and a small number of people have power 
over the Majority and oppress it, every 
victory over Nature will inevitably serve only 
to increase that power and that oppression. 
That is what is actually happening. 
With a science which aims not at studying 
how people ought to live, but at studying 
whatever exists – and which is therefore 
occupied chiefly in investigating inanimate 
things while allowing the order of human 
society to remain as it is – no improvements, 
no victories over Nature, can better the state 
of humanity. 
'But medical science? You are forgetting the 
beneficent progress made by medicine. And 
bacteriological inoculations? And recent 
surgical operations?' exclaim the defenders of 
science – adducing as a last resource the 
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success of medical science to prove the utility 
of all science. 'By inoculations we can prevent 
illness, or can cure it; we can perform 
painless operations: cut open a man's inside 
and clean it out, and can straighten 
hunchbacks,' is what is usually said by the 
defenders of present-day science, who seem 
to think that the curing of one child from 
diphtheria, among those Russian children of 
whom 50 per cent, (and even 80 per cent, in 
the Foundling Hospitals) die as a regular 
thing apart from diphtheria – must convince 
anyone of the beneficence of science in 
general. 
Our life is so arranged that not children only 
but a majority of people die from bad food, 
excessive and harmful work, bad dwellings 
and clothes, or want, before they have lived 
half the years that should be theirs. The order 
of things is such that children's illnesses, 
consumption, syphilis, and alcoholism, seize 
an ever-increasing number of victims, while a 
great part of men's labour is taken from them 
to prepare for wars, and every ten or twenty 
years millions of men are slaughtered in 
wars; and all this because science, instead of 
supplying correct religious, moral, and social 
ideas which would cause these ills to 
disappear of themselves, is occupied on the 
one hand in justifying the existing order, and 
on the other hand with toys. And in proof of 
the fruitfulness of science we are told that it 
cures one in a thousand of the sick, who are 
sick only because science has neglected its 
proper business. 
Yes, if science would devote but a small part 
of those efforts and that attention and labour 
which it now spends on trifles, to supplying 
men with correct religious, moral, social, or 
even hygienic ideas, there would not be a 
one-hundredth part of the diphtheria, the 
diseases of the womb, or the deformities, the 
occasional cure of which now makes science 
so proud, though such cures are effected in 
clinical hospitals the cost of whose luxurious 
appointments is too great for them to be at 
the service of all who need them. 
It is as though men who had ploughed badly, 
and sown badly with poor seeds, were to go 
over the ground tending some broken ears of 
corn and trampling on others that grew 
alongside, and   were  then to exhibit their 
skill in healing the injured ears as a proof of 
their knowledge of agriculture. 
Our science, in order to become science and 
to be really useful and not harmful to 
humanity, must first of all renounce its 
experimental method, which causes it to 
consider as its duty the study merely of what 
exists, and must return to the only reasonable 
and fruitful conception of science, which is 
that the object of science is to show how 
people ought to live. Therein lies the aim and 
importance of science; and the study of 
Things as they exist can only be a subject for 
science in so far as that study helps towards 
the knowledge of how men should live. 
It is just to the admission by experimental 
science of its own bankruptcy, and to the 
need of adopting another method, that 
Carpenter draws attention in this article. 
[Leo Tolstoy 1898] 
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